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 The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and 
stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of 
the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for the purpose of 
curing, together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and 
berries, and pasturing their horses on open and unclaimed lands.1  
                                                 
* J.D. expected, 2019, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the 
University of Montana; B.A. in History, 2007, Yale University. This piece grew out 
of my application Case Note for the Public Land & Resources Law Review, in which 
I was able to combine my longstanding passion for fishing and fisheries with 
developing interests in Environmental and Indian Law via a truly remarkable case. 
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear that case at the beginning of 2018, I was 
thrilled to be offered a chance to further analyze the dispute and its underlying 
issues. I would like to thank Professors Michelle Bryan, Monte Mills, and Hillary 
Wandler of the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana; 
the amazing editors and staff of the Public Land & Resources Law Review, 
especially Jonah Brown, Sarah Danno, and Ben Almy; and my dad, who sparked my 
love for the beauty of salmonids and the waters they inhabit. 
1.  Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, Etc. art. 3, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 
Stat. 1132. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Isaac Stevens, Superintendent of Indian Affairs and Governor of 
Washington Territory from 1853 to 1857, negotiated a series of treaties 
with Pacific Northwest Indian tribes, especially during 1854 and 1855.  
Through the Stevens Treaties (Treaties), regional tribes granted significant 
swaths of their historic lands to the United States, particularly in present-
day Washington State (Washington or the State) , in exchange for limited 
land reservations and protections of traditional fishing rights, both on and 
off the reservations.2  Language conveying those reserved rights (the 
Fishing Clause), excerpted above, remained largely identical across all 
Treaties.3  While short and consistent, the Fishing Clause has been 
controversial from the start. For more than a century it has sparked 
conflicts over fishing privileges, government duties, and treaty 
interpretation.4 
When the Treaties were signed, massive regional salmon 
populations––often considered endless––were central to Pacific 
Northwest tribal life, important for not only sustenance but also commerce 
and culture.5  Salmon are anadromous fish, meaning they mature and 
spend most of their adult lives in the ocean but return to freshwater streams 
in their historic ranges to spawn.6  As highways spread across Washington 
during the twentieth century, culverts were installed so streams could pass 
under roads.7  Those passages earned the moniker “barrier culverts” 
because while allowing water to flow through, they often prevent mature 
salmon from moving upstream to spawn or juvenile salmon (smolt) from 
moving seaward to grow.8  Combined with factors like commercial 
                                                 
2.  United States v. Washington, 827 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(emphasis added). 
3. Id. 
4. Id.  
5. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1001 (W.D. 
Wash. 2013). 
6. Washington, 827 F.3d at 845. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
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overharvest and dam construction, culverts directly contributed to 
precipitous salmon stock declines over the past 150 years.9 
In 2001, twenty-one Tribes (the Tribes) filed a Request for 
Determination in federal district court alleging Washington had violated 
and continued to violate Treaty fishing rights by inhibiting salmon 
movement throughout vital freshwater habitat.10 That 2001 Request for 
Determination was not a new case, but rather another chapter in litigation 
that began in 1970 when the United States, pursuant to its trust obligation 
and hoping to end a century of conflict, first sued Washington on behalf 
of the Tribes.11 That first decision enabled either side to “invoke the 
continuing jurisdiction of the district court to resolve disputes ‘concerning 
the subject matter of [that] case’” by filing a Request for Determination 
with the clerk of court laying out relevant facts and the resolution sought.12 
The long-running legal battle experienced another wait after the 
2001 Request until, in 2007, the district court directly attributed decreased 
salmon populations to barrier culvert propagation.13  The court thus held 
the State was in violation of its obligation under the Treaties, particularly 
the Fishing Clause, though it took another six years before the court issued 
an injunction forcing Washington to start fixing the harmful culverts.14  
Washington subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which in a June 2016 decision affirmed both the district court’s decision 
and propriety of its injunction.15  Approximately a year later, in August 
                                                 
9. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1002, 1013. 
10. Request for Determination, U.S. v. Washington, Civ. No. C709213 
(W.D. Wash. 2001). The Tribes included the Suquamish Indian Tribe, Jamestown 
S’Klallam, Lower Elwha Band of Klallams, Port Gamble Clallam, Nisqually Indian 
Tribe, Nooksack Tribe, Sauk-Suiattle Tribe, Skokomish Indian Tribe, Squaxin Island 
Tribe, Stillaguamish Tribe, Upper Skagit Tribe, Tulalip Tribes, Lummi Indian Nation, 
Quinault Indian Nation, Puyallup Tribe, Hoh Tribe, Confederated Tribes and Bands 
of the Yakama Indian Nation, Quileute Indian Tribe, Makah Indian Tribe, Swinomish 
Indian Tribal Community, and Muckleshoot Indian Tribe. 
11. Washington, 827 F.3d at 845 (citing United States v. State of 
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 327–28 (W.D. Wash. 1974)) [hereinafter Washington 
I]. 
12. Id. at 847 (citing Washington I., 384 F. Supp. at 419). 
13. Id. at 841. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 841, 849–65. 
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2017, Washington filed a petition for certiorari, which was granted on 
January 12, 2018.16  The United States Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments in this case on April 18, 2018.  
 
II. EARLY TREATY YEARS AND ORIGINS OF CONFLICT 
 
Stevens Treaties have inspired more than a century of litigation, 
but underlying conflicts date back even further, to the arrival of white 
settlers in the Washington territory during the 1800s.17 By the late 1800s, 
settlers blocked many of the Tribes’ traditional fishing sites on the Pacific 
coast and Puget Sound, along with the Columbia River and its tributaries.18 
Because regional Tribes were intensely reliant on vast salmon populations 
for not only sustenance, but also cultural, religious, and economic life, 
losing access to their fishing sites created dire hardships.19  The Fishing 
Clause served to acknowledge and provide for the Tribes’ dependence on 
fisheries; as Indians gave up land, they needed to retain rights to traditional 
fishing sites and their salmon harvests.20  
Despite the Treaties, most Tribes found both access to fishi A 
duty to protect salmon populations and habitat ng sites and the volume 
of fish available severely restricted by the turn of the 20th century.21  
Related litigation, a case called United States v Winans, first reached the 
United States Supreme Court around that same time in 1905.22 In Winans, 
the Yakima Tribe complained that two brothers completely barred Indians 
from a traditional fishing site while using large mechanized fish wheels to 
monopolize massive salmon harvests.23  The Court held that the Yakimas 
were entitled to an easement across the Winans’ land allowing access to 
                                                 
16. Pet. for Writ of Cert., Aug. 17, 2017, No. 17-269. 
17.  Id. at 841–42.  
18. Id. 
19. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 665 (1979). 
20. Id. at 666. 
21. Washington, 827 F.3d at 842. 
22. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). 
23. Id. at 380. 
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their “usual and accustomed” fishing site, and that the Treaty barred use 
of mechanical fish wheels.24 
In the century following Winans, the Tribes, State, and United 
States regularly contested Treaty matters in court, particularly the Fishing 
Clause.25  Washington’s state courts consistently read those as narrowly as 
possible, minimizing tribal fishing rights while expanding State regulatory 
powers and opportunities for commercial fishermen.26  Their rulings 
largely reject tribal requests for access, licensing law exceptions, or any 
type of state liability for drastic salmon population declines.27  
For example, in the 1916 Washington Supreme Court case State 
v. Towessnute, a Yakima Indian charged with fishing without a license off 
his reservation defended that he had been fishing at one of his Tribe’s usual 
and accustomed places.28  Under the Treaty, such actions were supposedly 
protected; the United States Supreme Court in Winans had reinforced 
tribal rights to traditional fishing grounds and even granted Indians 
easements across non-Indian private property to usual and accustomed 
fishing grounds.29 The Washington Supreme Court, on the other hand, 
called the entire Treaty a “dubious document” and rejected the Indian’s 
defense.30  While bound to the Winans holding granting Indians easements 
to traditional fishing grounds, Washington’s Supreme Court held that the 
State could simultaneously restrict Indian fishing rights through 
regulation.31  
                                                 
24. Id. at 383. 
25. See State v. Towessnute, 154 P. 805 (Wash. 1916); State v. Alexis, 
154 P. 810 (Wash. 1916);  Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); 
Washington v. Tulee, 109 P.2d 280 (Wash. 1941); and Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 
618 (1942), among other related cases. 
26. Washington, 827 F.3d at 843–45. 
27. Id. 
28. Towessnute, 154 P. 805 at 805–06. 
29. Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.  
30. Towessnute, 154 P. at 806. 
31. Id. at 809.  The court relied on three main contentions, attempting  
to tie all of them together in its holding.  First, they alleged Washington had fewer 
rights as a territory than as a state, meaning Stevens Treaties and the rights they 
conferred on Indians lost significant weight when Washington achieved statehood. 
Second, they called out the “Equal Footing” doctrine, which guaranteed states 
admission to the union on the same political level as the original colonies.  Finally, 
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Subsequently, Washington steadily implemented policies via 
legislation, ballot initiatives, and court decisions making it increasingly 
difficult for Indians to fish at all, much less using traditional methods at 
their usual and accustomed places.32  Washington constructed rules in 
ways that favored mostly white, commercial fishermen harvesting salmon 
from the ocean, while making it nearly impossible for Indians to 
traditionally fish in freshwater rivers and streams.33  In 1907, for example, 
the State banned all off-reservation fishing above the tide line unless done 
by hook and line.34  Because Indians traditionally fished with traps and 
nets, the prohibition effectively overruled the Fishing Clause.35   
From voter initiatives banning traditional fishing gear to 
aggressive expansion and enforcement of statewide licensing laws, 
Washington continued attacking treaty-based fishing rights into the second 
half of the twentieth century.36  By the 1960s and 70s, with Indians 
essentially limited to fishing on reservations, Tribes began resisting via 
“fish ins” and other protests dubbed “fish wars.”37 That proved the federal 
government’s breaking point as well because in 1970, the United States 
filed its first suit against Washington on behalf of the Tribes to defend the 
Treaties and Fishing Clause.38  Nearly half a century later, that litigation 
remains unsettled. 
 
III. THE TRIBES TAKE ON THE STATE 
 
The United States brought its initial 1970 federal case against the 
State, alleging violations of the Treaties and Fishing Clause, in the 
Western District of Washington.39  Given the number of parties and 
                                                 
they claimed the police power belonged to Washington, and that trumped the legal 
power of any easement. 
32. Washington, 827 F.3d at 843–45. 
33. Id. at 843. 
34. Id. citing Wash. Sess. Laws, Ch. 247, § 2 (1907). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 843–45. 
37. Id. at 844–45. 
38. Id. at 845. 
39. Id. (citing Washington I., 384 F. Supp. at 327–28). 
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potential parties––particularly the various tribes––and a desire to avoid 
more never-ending conflict, that court suggested: 
 
that so far as possible all tribes, agencies or organizations 
having or claiming direct or indirect justiciable interest in 
treaty fishing rights in this judicial district be brought into 
the case either as parties or as amicus curiae; and that 
every issue of substantial direct or indirect significance to 
the contentions of any party be raised and adjudicated in 
this case.40 
 
Judge Boldt hoped that by devoting time to joining parties, 
isolating issues, and conducting research at the outset, the legal 
proceedings would “at long last, thereby finally settle, either in this 
decision or on appeal thereof, as many as possible of the divisive problems 
of treaty right fishing which for so long have plagued all of the citizens of 
this area, and still do.”41  While the Judge’s motivations were noble, the 
case’s continued active presence in the judicial system more than forty 
years later shows that they were largely for naught. 
That first suit against Washington alleging violation of Stevens 
Treaties and the Fishing Clause (again, “Washington I,” as briefly 
discussed earlier) yielded what is popularly known as the “Boldt decision,” 
which divided the case into two phases.42  In Phase I, Judge Boldt held the 
Fishing Clause guaranteed the Tribes one half of the proportion of 
annually harvestable fish.  In Phase II, Judge Boldt held the fishing clause 
also guaranteed the Tribes a “right to have the fishery habitat protected 
from man-made despoliation.”43 The Ninth Circuit, however, vacated 
Phase II, finding the harms allegedly violating Treaty fishing rights––
environmental despoliation and human-caused degradation of salmon 
habitat––too vague.44  That court held: 
                                                 
40. Washington I, 384 F. Supp. at 328. 
41. Id. at 330. 
42. Washington, 827 F.3d at 845–46. 
43. United States v. State, 506 F. Supp. 187, 203 (W.D. Wash. 1980) 
[hereinafter Washington II].  
44. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en 
banc) [hereinafter Washington III]. 
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the legal standards that will govern the State’s precise 
obligations and duties under the treaty with respect to the 
myriad State actions that may affect the environment of 
the treaty area will depend for their definition and 
articulation upon concrete facts which underlie a dispute 
in a particular case.45  
 
Despite overturning a broad State environmental duty to protect 
fisheries, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the State may still have 
environmental obligations under the fishing clause of the Treaties; the 
Tribes and the United States could potentially prevail in litigation over 
such obligations, though they would have to point with greater specificity 
at a discreet harm to salmon or habitat caused directly by State actions.46  
The Tribes saw an opportunity to do just that in 2001 when they 
filed a request for determination seeking “to enforce a duty upon the State 
of Washington to refrain from constructing and maintaining culverts under 
State roads that degrade fish habitat so that adult fish production is 
reduced.”47  The United States joined that suit on behalf of the Tribes, 
seeking a permanent injunction forcing Washington to “repair, retrofit, 
maintain, or replace” culverts that “degrade appreciably” the passage of 
fish within five years.48 
Washington and its State agencies named as defendants argued the 
Treaties did not convey any right to the Tribes regarding fish habitat, nor 
did it establish a corresponding State duty to protect fish habitat.49  Next, 
Washington alleged that because the targeted culverts diverted streams 
underneath highways funded in part with federal money and approved by 
federal agencies, it was justified in its belief that such culverts complied 
with the Treaties (waiver defense).50 Third, Washington noted that the 
United States also operated culverts impeding fish migration and that it 
should not have to comply with Treaty duties if they did not also apply to 
                                                 
45. Id. at 1357. 
46. Id. 
47. Washington, 827 F.3d at 847. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 847. 
50. Id. 
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the federal government.51  Finally, Washington counter-claimed the 
United States violated its duty under the Treaties and filed an injunction 
forcing replacement of its own problematic culverts.52  
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
United States and the Tribes.  Unlike in Washington III,53 here the United 
States and Tribes demonstrated “concrete facts” showing that culverts 
caused direct harm to the salmon fisheries statewide.54  Because the court 
held that Washington had a duty to protect not only traditional tribal 
fishing rights, but also the fish stocks and habitats enabling those rights to 
be utilized for sustenance and commerce, it found discreet harm caused by 
culverts, which were clearly the property and responsibility of the State.55  
Seeking a solution, the district court held a bench trial in 2009 and 
2010, after which the district court had to determine an appropriate 
practical remedy––a challenging and time-consuming task.56  In 2013, the 
district court finally issued both a Memorandum and Decision in favor of 
the Tribes and a permanent injunction.57  The injunction, proposed by the 
Tribes in 2010 before Judge Martinez signed off on it in 2013, gave 
specific directions to Washington and its associated agencies as to how 
they should deal with the culvert problem.58  
Judge Martinez highlighted the myriad benefits of correcting these 
issues in his Memorandum and Decision to support the injunction, stating, 
“the public interest will not be disserved by an injunction. To the contrary, 
it is in the public’s interest, as well as the Tribes’ to accelerate the pace of 
barrier correction.  All fishermen, not just tribal fishermen, would 
                                                 
51. Id. at 848. 
52. Id. 
53. 759 F.2d 1353. 
54. Washington, 827 F.3d at 848. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. See United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986 (W.D. 
Wash. 2013) (compilation of major post-trial substantive orders) [hereinafter 
Washington IV]. 
57. Washington, 827 F.3d at 857. See Washington IV, 20 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1000–25.  
58. Washington IV, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 1023–25.  
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benefit.”59  He also justified the need for the injunction by noting recent 
developments and a desire for rapid action:  
 
An injunction is necessary to ensure that the State will act 
expeditiously in correcting the barrier culverts which 
violate the Treaty Promises.  The reduced effort by the 
State over the past three years, resulting in a net increase 
in the number of barrier culverts in the Case Area, 
demonstrates that injunctive relief is required at this time 
to remedy Treaty violations.60 
 
Quoting Governor Stevens himself, who said, “I want that you 
shall not simply have food and drink now but that you may have them 
forever,” the court held that salmon stocks have declined precipitously in 
recent decades, habitat degradation is a primary cause of that decline, 
culverts contribute notably to habitat degradation, and the result to the 
Tribes has been economic, cultural, and social harm.61  The accompanying 
injunction directed the State to list all problem culverts and to correct those 
within various timeframes.62 
Washington appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals on several grounds.  Most robust among those, it 
objected to the district court’s interpretation of the Treaties, claiming those 
imposed on it no duty related to barrier culverts.  The State also objected 
to the overruling of its waiver defense, alleging that the United States had 
earlier opportunities to step in and either raise concerns about culvert 
construction or stop it altogether. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
59. Id. at 1022. 
60. Id. (emphasis added). 
61. Washington, 827 F.3d at 848 (citing Washington IV at 1000-22). 
62. Id. at 848–49 (citing Washington IV at 1023-25). 
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S 2016-2017 DECISION 
 
A. A duty to protect salmon populations and habitat 
 
In its appellate brief, Washington rejected a reading of the Treaties 
that would impose upon it any sort of duty to protect fish habitat.  It 
claimed the language was clear and unambiguous, stating, “on its face, the 
right of taking fish in common with all citizens does not include a right to 
prevent the State from making land use decisions that could incidentally 
impact fish.”63  The State advocated a reading of the Treaties based on 
“plain language” and “historical interpretation,” in which they have no 
duty involving fish habitat.64   
The court disagreed with Washington’s analysis, calling their 
view of the Treaties “misconstrue[d]” and “remarkably one-sided.”65  
While Washington argued the principal purpose of the Treaties was to 
facilitate white settlement of the Northwest, the court rejected that notion 
entirely, instead holding their principal purpose was to ensure Indians 
could support themselves. For Pacific Northwest Tribes, salmon were key 
to survival.  As early as Winans, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that “the right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was 
a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of which 
there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less 
necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they 
breathed.”66 
The Winans court finished evaluating this argument by noting that 
even though in building and maintaining barrier culverts, Washington did 
not act “for the primary purpose or object of affecting or regulating the 
fish supply,” those actions still harmed the fishery.67  The court found that 
Washington’s culverts directly resulted in a loss of roughly five million 
square meters of salmon habitat, including 1,000 linear miles of streams, 
                                                 
63. Brief of Appellant State of Wash., 27–-28, Oct. 7, 2013, 13-35474, 
13-35519. 
64. Id. at 27, Brief of Appellant State of Wash., 27, Oct. 7, 2013, 13-
35474, 13-35519. 
65. Id. at 851–-52. 
66. Winans, 198 U.S at 371, 381. (1905). 
67. Washington, 827 F.3d at 853. 
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and that salmon populations were currently not sufficient to provide for 
the Tribes as promised by the Treaties.68  The court thus held Washington 
had a duty under the Treaties regarding maintenance of salmon habitat, 
and their use of barrier culverts violated that duty.69  
 
B. The United States did not waive its ability to allege a Treaty violation 
 
Washington’s second argument on appeal hinged on the United 
States’ failure to contest a 1999 state “Forest and Fish Report,” in which 
it addressed many issues regarding fish and roads.70  The State therefore 
contended that the federal government, via the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS) and Federal Highway Administration, inferentially 
approved the State’s proposed actions as not in violation of the Treaties.71  
The Ninth Circuit assertively rejected this argument.  While the 
United States was a party in this action, the court noted they brought this 
action on behalf of the Tribes and the rights at issue belonged to the Tribes 
alone under the Treaties.72  Therefore, the United States’ actions or lack 
thereof on Washington highway proposals had no bearing on infringement 
of tribal Treaty rights.  Only Congress may abrogate Treaties.  Here, they 
remain in full force.73  
After rejecting all of the State’s attempted arguments against the 
outcome of the 2009-10 bench trial and 2013 decision, on June 27, 2016, 
a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court, further justified the injunctive relief, and denied any stay, 
suggesting a major victory for the Tribes.74  While this opinion included 
many notable elements, three in particular stood out. First, the panel not 
only affirmed that the Treaties established valid off-reservation tribal 
fishing rights “at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations,” and that 
                                                 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 853–854. 
72. Id. at 854. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 849–65. 
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those remain in force today,75 but also recognized an implied guarantee of 
sustainable fish populations in those traditional places: 
 
The Indians did not understand the Treaties to promise 
that they would have access to their usual and accustomed 
fishing places, but with a qualification that would allow 
the government to diminish or destroy the fish runs. 
Governor Stevens did not make, and the Indians did not 
understand him to make, such a cynical and disingenuous 
promise. The Indians reasonably understood Governor 
Stevens to promise not only that they would have access 
to their usual and accustomed fishing places, but also that 
there would be fish sufficient to sustain them.76 
 
Second, the panel held Washington’s constructing hundreds of 
barrier culverts blocking roughly 1,000 miles of salmon habitat a “concrete 
fact” showing the State “acted affirmatively” by installing those culverts.77 
Thus, even absent deliberate efforts to harm salmon, the panel still found 
Washington in violation of its Treaty obligations via use of barrier 
culverts.78  
Finally, the panel rejected Washington’s claims that both 
distinctions between federal and state actions combined with collaboration 
between federal and state actors waived the Tribes’ complaint.  The State 
alleged that because the Washington State Department of Natural 
Resources (WSDNR) consulted with federal authorities regarding 
proposed fixes of fish habitat problems, ostensibly including barrier 
culverts, the State could reasonably assume the National Marine Fisheries 
Service had signed off on those proposals as reasonable under any federal 
treaties.79  Washington supplemented this contention with two similar 
points: first, that many state highways with barrier culverts were built 
partly with federal funds, and second, federal administration of permitting 
                                                 
75. Id. at 849 (quoting  Washington  v.  Wash.  State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 674 (1979)). 
76. Washington, 827 F.3d at 851. 
77. Id. at 852–53. 
78. Id. at 853. 
79. Id. at 853–54. 
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under the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act never raised red 
flags about culvert problems.80  Responding to all of those, the panel 
explained that federal-state interactions did not influence the validity of 
the Treaties, that the Tribes had never acted in any way to give up their 
treaty rights, and that the Tribes never authorized actions that would 
substantially harm salmon stocks.81 
On January 12, 2018, the United States Supreme Court granted 
Washington’s petition for certiorari in this case, adding yet another round 
of arguments to this longstanding legal conflict.  
 
V. FROM CIRCUIT TO SUPREME: EXHAUSTING REMEDIES AND 
PETITIONING FOR CERTIORARI 
 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Final Word 
  
On May 19, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit issued an order that 1) summarized the facts of the case and 
previous decisions, using that to support its denial of both the petition for 
panel and en banc rehearings; 2) provided a high-level overview, though 
not an official dissent, explaining what it would take to legally overturn 
the existing decisions, and 3) gave a brief commentary criticizing the 
judges advocating for rehearings as perpetrating misconceptions about the 
functionality of the appellate courts.  
 
B. Denial of Rehearing Requests 
 
In a circuit as large as the Ninth, its remarkably rare to get all 
judges to agree on any one thing.  Petitions for rehearing are no different 
in that regard. Despite the judges’ collegiality and mutual respect, they 
sometimes disagree on the proper outcome for a case. Hence, dissatisfied 
parties can petition for a rehearing en banc even if they have lost at every 
level until that point.82 Such rehearings are not guaranteed, however; in 
the Ninth Circuit, a case must receive votes from a simple majority of non-
                                                 
80. Id. at 854–55. 
81. Id.  
82. Pub. Info. Office, Ninth Circuit En Banc Procedure Summary, 
Media Advisory (U.S. Cts. for the Ninth Circuit, S.F., Cal.), February 10, 2017 
(contact David Madden). 
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recused judges to earn that privilege.  Two unique considerations further 
complicate this process: the vote results are anonymous, and senior judges 
are not allowed to participate in the en banc proceedings unless they sat 
on the case’s original three-judge panel.   
 
C. Washington Petitions for Writ of Certiorari 
 
By mid- 2017, having lost in front of Judge Martinez, Chief Judge 
of the District Court for the Western District of Washington, failed to rally 
any of Judges Fletcher, Gould, and Ezra of the Ninth Circuit Panel to their 
cause, and struck out in advocating for a Ninth Circuit panel or en banc 
rehearing, counsel for the State of Washington faced an unenviable 
position.  Despite everything, however, Washington determined to press 
on, filing a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court on August 17, 2017.83 This launched a brand-new wave of 
submissions, back-and-forth discussion, and argument over this same 
topic, one of the many that has confounded not only lawyers, but also 
politicians, tribal members, commercial and recreational anglers, 
Washington residents, state engineers, wildlife biologists, and even 
economists.  Members of these groups are thus lining up as amici on either 
side as this case affects them. 
 
VI. BRIEFING BEFORE SUPREME COURT ORAL ARGUMENTS 
  
Washington’s Petition for Certiorari initiated preparation at the 
Supreme Court level, and the docket steadily began to grow as the requisite 
motions, responses, and replies, along with supplemental procedural 
pieces, arrived from Washington (Petitioner) on the one side, and both the 
Tribes and the United States (Respondents) on the other.84 After 
Washington filed its petition, it took roughly four months for all requisite 
elements to arrive; with the filing of Washington’s Reply To Briefs In 
Opposition on December 11, 2017, the stage was set for review and 
decision.85  Two days later, the collected materials were distributed to each 
Justice, giving them slightly more than three weeks for review during one 
                                                 
83. Pet. for Writ of Cert., Aug. 17, 2017, No. 17-269. 
84.  Docket, No. 17-269, Aug. 21, 2017. 
85.  Reply to Br. in Opp’n, Dec. 11, 2017, No. 17-269. 
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of the busiest and most hectic seasons of the year before they would have 
to officially take up the issue as a group, deciding its fate during one of the 
Court’s regularly scheduled Friday conferences. 
Against long odds, on January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court 
granted Washington’s Petition for Certiorari.86 In the order announcing 
that decision, the cert news was actually not even the headline; rather, it 
was buried beneath an announcement that “[t]he motion of Modoc Point 
Irrigation District, et al. for leave to file a brief as amici curiae is 
granted.”87  Both Petitioners and the lawyers at MODOC Point returned 
home happy that evening. 
 
A. Brief for the Petitioner: Washington Aims for a More Favorable 
Outcome 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision to review the United States v. 
Washington case breathed new life into Defendant-Petitioners, their 
counsel, and their supporters. While undoubtedly exciting for that group, 
the result also meant that Washington would need to prepare and submit 
new documents, most importantly their opening brief as petitioners, 
explaining why all of the lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit, had 
gotten this decision wrong. 88  Only six weeks after their petition was 
granted, Washington submitted a 78-page Brief for the Petitioner on 
February 24, 2018, laying out its case advocating reversal of the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision.89  Not simply repeating the arguments they made––and 
which two federal courts had rejected––in earlier proceedings, Petitioners 
                                                 
86.  United States v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 735 (2012) (mem.);        
October Term 2016: Statistics as of June 28, 2017, U.S. Sup. Ct. 
J.,  Oct.  2016,  at  II, https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/Jnl16.pdf. While data 
fluctuates from year to year, the chance of a Petition for Certiorari being granted in 
any Supreme Court term tends to hoover right around 1%. 
87.  Miscellaneous Order List: 583 U.S., U.S. Sup. Ct. Ord. List, Jan. 
12,  2018, at  p.1,  https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/ 
011218zr_3d9g.pdf.  
88. Pet’rs’ Br., Feb. 24, 2018, No. 17-269.  
89. Docket No. 17-269, Aug. 21, 2017. 
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redirect their focus and substantially tweak their primary contentions from 
how they were previously presented.90  
First, regarding tribal rights under Stevens Treaties, the State 
focuses almost exclusively on “[w]hether the treaty ‘right of taking fish, 
at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations . . . in common with all 
citizens’ guaranteed ‘that the number of fish would always be sufficient to 
provide a “moderate living” to the tribes.’”91  Compare this to the first 
query Washington posed in materials for the Ninth Circuit, in which the 
State questioned proper treaty interpretation on a much broader level and 
contended that nothing in the Stevens Treaties prevented “incidental” 
land-use decisions by the government that carried a mere possibility of 
impacting fish populations.92  
Next, Washington asserted that the Treaties’ plain language said 
nothing about caring for salmon habitat, meaning they could never have 
any obligations in that regard toward the affected tribes.93  This suggests 
Petitioner expects the Supreme Court to be more receptive to this argument 
than the Ninth Circuit Panel, which robustly rejected the argument. 
Specifically, after ample discussion, the panel “conclude[d] that in 
building and maintaining barrier culverts within the Case Area, 
Washington has violated and is continuing to violate its obligation to the 
Tribes under the Treaties.”94  It arrived at this determination by examining 
how the Tribes would have understood the Treaties and Fishing Clause at 
the time of their enactment, quoting the words of Isaac Stevens himself, 
and perhaps most important for this setting, citing multiple relevant and 
controlling Supreme Court holdings.95 
The second and third questions presented provide arguments in 
Washington’s favor not based on the Treaties or tribal rights.  Question 
two asks whether the federal government could legitimately require 
culvert removal by Washington given that federal authorities entered into 
                                                 
90. Pet’rs’ Br. at i, Feb. 24, 2018, No. 17-269. 
91. Id. 
92. Br. Appellant St. of Wash., at 27–28, Oct. 7, 2013, Nos. 13-35474, 
13-35519. 
93. Id. 
94. Washington, 827 F.3d at 853 (emphasis added).  
95. Id. at 849–853 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 675-77; and 
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381). 
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Stevens treaties, and federal authorities also told the State to design its 
culverts precisely in the way now being challenged.96 Again, a comparison 
with prior proceedings provides interesting insights. In this case, though, 
it is not the differences between earlier arguments and this one, but rather 
the similarities that is curious.  Petitioner made almost this exact same 
claim, which seemed to be Washington’s weakest, in front of the Ninth 
Circuit to no avail.97  As the Ninth Circuit explained, the federal 
government’s actions toward Washington’s state government do not bear 
on this litigation; the United States is a named party only inasmuch as it is 
assisting with representation of tribes and tribal interests.98  At its root, this 
case is between a consolidated group of Tribes and Washington State for 
harms the latter allegedly caused the former.  Even if the United States 
somehow enabled or conspired with Washington to facilitate those harms, 
it would not change the fact that Washington’s policies and actions are 
those on trial here, not those of the federal government.99 
Finally, Petitioner questions the actions of earlier courts in 
evaluating and deciding on these matters.  In particular, Washington 
suggests the fixes they are required to undertake due to the district and 
appellate decisions are both unfair, claiming they will not solve the alleged 
problem but cost a great deal.100  This could wind up a fascinating 
discussion point, particularly as it relates to the Fishing Vessel case.101  The 
two sides take starkly opposing views on the precedent that case set, with 
Washington contending that the “moderate living” standard of tribal fish 
harvest was a maximum, while Respondents instead arguing it should be 
a floor.  Considering this litigation in a broader sense, this question could 
reinforce one of the primary aspects of the Tribes’ complaints: fish 
populations are nowhere near robust enough to provide a moderate living, 
much less a minimal or barebones one, to those Tribes.  That detail of 
Fishing Vessel thus seems an odd, and possibly ill-advised, focus for 
Washington in this situation. 
 
                                                 
96. Pet’rs’ Br. at i-ii, Feb. 28, 2018, No. 17-269. 
97. Washington, 827 F.3d at 853–854. 
98. Id.  
99. Id. 
100. Pet’rs’ Br. at i-ii, Feb. 28, 2018, No. 17-269. 
101. Washington, 827 F.3d at 864-865. 
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B. Briefs for the United States and Tribal Respondents: The Courts 
Already Did Things Right 
 
Counsel for the United States and Tribes faced a task far different 
from those representing Washington in this appeal.  Lawyers for both 
respondents need not convince the Supreme Court of errors or oversights, 
neither must they determine what about their case failed to win over those 
preceding judges. 102  Moreover, as respondents they have the luxury of 
having seen Petitioners’ brief in advance of finalizing their own, enabling 
them to directly address anything surprising or compelling.  Overall, these 
briefs seek to clearly and compellingly show that “[t]he courts below 
properly concluded that the Stevens Treaties prohibit the State from 
imposing obstructions that substantially degrade or destroy the Tribes’ 
traditional fisheries.”103  The Tribes echo that exact same sentiment to 
open their argument, but in greater detail and shorter chunks: 
 
Barrier culverts cut off salmon from places where the 
Tribes have the right to take fish. They also prevent 
salmon from returning from the ocean to reproduce, 
substantially degrading the tribal fishery. For both 
reasons, the district court correctly held that Washington 
has violated the Treaties. And the court properly exercised 
its discretion to remedy that violation through an order 
that gives the State both time and flexibility to fix the 
problem.104 
 
Like Washington’s brief, both the United States and Tribes open 
with relevant historical background––the United States’ brief’s first 
sentence takes the reader all the way back to the Lewis and Clark 
Expedition and Louisiana Purchase105––and an overview of prior 
proceedings, which are quite extensive in these particular circumstances. 
                                                 
102. U.S. Br., March 26, 2018, No. 17-269; Resp’ts’ Br., March 26, 
2018, No. 17-269. 
103. U.S. Br. at 15, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
104. Resp’ts’ Br. at 23, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
105. U.S. Br. at 2, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
 
            PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW    Vol. 39 
 
 
 
272 
The Tribes do not reach quite as far back in their brief, instead first 
focusing on the Stevens Treaties, particularly the fishing rights they 
secured to regional Tribes and the current insecurity of those rights.106 
Finally, the “moderate living” idea or issue, which Washington 
paid particular attention to in its own brief, receives considerable 
corresponding discussion in both respondents’ briefs.  Reading 
Washington’s commentary in isolation could convince a clerk or justice 
that the Ninth Circuit had at least somewhat erred in its opinion by 
misconstruing the “moderate living” standard and how it applied in these 
circumstances.  Counsel representing the Tribes and authoring their brief 
thus strongly refute that idea: 
 
[T]he State devotes its brief entirely to challenging the 
Ninth Circuit’s supposed recognition of a “new right” for 
the Tribes to demand a “moderate living” from fishing. It 
is undisputed that the Tribes are not earning a moderate 
living from the fishery, but that is not the basis of the 
Tribes’ claim. Indeed, the circuit judges on the panel 
rejected Washington’s reading of their decision, 
explaining that the panel did “not hold that the Tribes are 
entitled to enough salmon to provide a moderate living, 
irrespective of the circumstances”; rather, the State is 
liable under the Treaties because it “acted affirmatively to 
build ... barrier culverts that block the passage of salmon, 
with the consequence of substantially diminishing the 
supply of harvestable salmon.”107  
 
Immediately after this explanation, the Tribes’ brief reminds 
readers that disagreeing with the appellate court’s opinion would still not 
adequately justify reversing its judgment.108 
                                                 
106. Resp’ts’ Br. at 1, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
107. Resp’ts’ Br. at 24, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269 (internal citations 
omitted). 
108. Id.  
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Throughout these submitted documents, both the United States 
and the Tribes consistently reiterate the major findings in their favor from 
earlier decisions, particularly:  
1) The “Right” described in the Fishing Clause of the Treaties as 
“secured” does not grant Tribes any new rights, but instead protects 
existing ones: not only the opportunity to fish, but also a guarantee of the 
fishery’s continued health and existence. 109 
2) Washington had violated and was still violating the Treaties, 
simply through the ongoing presence and use of barrier culverts.110 
3) The District Court did not buy Washington’s attempts to show 
an equitable defense, largely by pointing to both interaction and lack 
thereof between Federal and State authorities in various contexts. The 
issue at hand in this line of cases is Washington’s violations of the 
Treaties, not the federal government’s violations or even similar actions.111 
 
C. Amici 
 
Despite fairly limited media coverage, especially when this case 
was granted certiorari, it is clear that people, groups, and even 
governments across vast swaths of the country held some sort of interest 
or stake in its outcome. 112  Significant numbers have demonstrated this by 
seeking leave to file amici briefs on behalf of one side or the other, even 
when the case was only being considered for Supreme Court review.113  
Some of the most vested include: the American Forest & Paper 
Association and National Mining Association; the Washington State 
Association of Counties and Association of Washington Cities; Business, 
Home Building, Real Estate, Farming and Municipal Organizations; the 
Pacific Legal Foundation, the MODAC Point Irrigation District, and an 
aggregation of states: Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, 
Nebraska, and Wyoming.114  
 
 
                                                 
109. Id. at 25–26; U.S. Br. at 19–24, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
110. Id. at 38–44; U.S. Br. at 51–52, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
111. Id. at 49–52; U.S. Br. at 41–45, March 26, 2018, No. 17-269. 
112. Docket No. 17-269, Aug. 21, 2017. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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VII. LOOKING FORWARD 
 
Had this case been denied certiorari and ended with the 2016-17 
Ninth Circuit Opinion, its outcome would have represented a clear victory 
for the Tribes.  Now, having been heard by the Supreme Court, the 
conclusion is once more in flux.  What impact may this decision have, both 
in the Pacific Northwest and elsewhere? That will depend how the vote 
goes. 
Option 1: The court splits 4–4. Justice Kennedy recused himself 
quite late in these proceedings––less than a month before oral arguments–
–due to a conflict not caught during the normal screening process.115 If the 
court splits down the middle as a result, the evenly-divided court would 
affirm the most recent 2016-17 Ninth Circuit decision and injunction 
without an opinion, precedential weight, or bar on future reconsideration.  
Option 2: A majority of justices vote to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s 
2016-17 decision. This would have the same immediate result as option 
one, but with the addition of precedential value, a written opinion, and 
possibly dissents and/or concurrences.  
Option 3: A majority of justices vote to overturn some or all 
aspects of the Ninth Circuit’s 2016-17 decision. This outcome probably 
has the most mystery surrounding it, as the impact would heavily depend 
on which part or parts of the Ninth Circuit decision the Supreme Court 
overturns, along with what instructions the Supreme Court in terms of 
precedential law and how it should be applied. 
Under either Option 1 or 2, the current situation in Washington 
will likely not change much, if at all.  Notably, Washington is moving 
forward with culvert fixes mandated under the Ninth Circuit decision and 
injunction.  While much work remains, at least some progress is being 
made in replacing problematic culverts.  Moreover, the Washington 
Department of Transportation has updated project lists and cost estimates 
accordingly and now maintains an informational website exclusively 
providing information about these changes.116 
                                                 
115. Letter from Clerk of Court Scott S. Harris to Noah G. Purcell, 
William M. Jay, & Noel J. Francisco (March 23, 2018), in Re: No. 17-269, Washington 
v. United States, et al. 
116. Improving Fish Passage, Wash. St. Dep’t of Transp., 
wsdot.wa.gov, https://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Projects/FishPassage/default.htm (last 
visited, April 19, 2018). 
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This decision could also pave the way for further cases regarding 
degraded salmon habitat in the region.  So long as Tribes isolate a concrete 
action taken by target defendants and describe with specificity how that 
action has negatively impacted salmon or their range, such complaints may 
prevail in the courtroom based on this precedent.  Because the Ninth 
Circuit read the Treaties to include a duty on both Washington and the 
United States to not only protect access to salmon via traditional fishing 
methods and locations, but also ensure adequate populations of those 
salmon, the Tribes could allege other infringements of the Treaties based 
on that latter duty. For example, a logical next step may be for the Tribes 
to challenge federally owned and managed culverts in the region, 
something directly addressed in this decision. Alternatively, if Tribes 
could identify a specific practice in Puget Sound or other coastal areas that 
negatively impact salmon returns, they may be able to seek an injunction 
on this precedent.  
A related aspect of this result is the creation of a spectrum between 
concrete, actionable environmental harms and undefined ones that cannot 
be redressed via the Stevens Treaties.  Standing in stark contrast to their 
1985 Washington III decision, the Ninth Circuit here determines that the 
use and maintenance of barrier culverts constitutes a particularized, 
solvable treaty violation.  What else could be a concrete, fixable harm? 
Tribes could consider an even larger-scale run at this matter reminiscent 
of Massachusetts v. EPA.117  The reason the Tribes triumphed here while 
the Ninth Circuit vacated similar proceedings in 1985 is relatively simple: 
specificity.  The 1985 Court “held that the issue was too broad and varied 
to be resolved in a general and undifferentiated fashion, and that the issue 
of human-caused environmental degradation must be resolved in the 
context of particularized disputes.”118  That begs the question, given 
advances in climate and environmental science, what else may fit in that 
category?  
With modern understanding of climate change, particularly 
science quantifying human impacts, could the Tribes now craft a 
successful complaint alleging that climate change is infringing upon their 
Treaty rights related to salmon? Provided they could identify and articulate 
                                                 
117. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
118. Washington, 827 F.3d at 846. 
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“concrete facts” as to actions harming salmon or their habitat, supported 
by scientific evidence, United States v. Washington suggests that Tribes 
could triumph on an even larger scale, at least based on current 
interpretation of these nearly-170-year-old treaties. 
 
 
